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THEO A.F. KUIPERS
ABDUCTION AIMING AT EMPIRICAL PROGRESS OR EVEN
TRUTH APPROXIMATION LEADING TO A CHALLENGE
FOR COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING
ABSTRACT. This paper primarily deals with the conceptual prospects for gener-
alizing the aim of abduction from the standard one of explaining surprising or
anomalous observations to that of empirical progress or even truth approximation.
It turns out that the main abduction task then becomes the instrumentalist task
of theory revision aiming at an empirically more successful theory, relative to
the available data, but not necessarily compatible with them. The rest, that is,
genuine empirical progress as well as observational, referential and theoretical
truth approximation, is a matter of evaluation and selection, and possibly new
generation tasks for further improvement. The paper concludes with a survey of
possible points of departure, in AI and logic, for computational treatment of the
instrumentalist task guided by the ‘comparative evaluation matrix’.
KEY WORDS: abduction, empirical progress, truth approximation, truthlikeness
1. INTRODUCTION
In the literature there is more or less agreement about the general
nature of abduction. Following Aliseda (1997), it amounts to the
search for an acceptable explanatory hypothesis for a surprising
or anomalous (individual or general) observational fact. To get a
sharper idea of it, we need to make two distinctions. First, there
is the distinction between the process of abduction and the product.
Second, the process can be subdivided into three phases: the genera-
tion of one or more hypotheses, their evaluation, and the selection
of one of them as the best one. The second subdivision may be
merely analytical, for the three aspects of the process may in fact
be integrated. Combining the two distinctions, we get the following
division of the total product in kinds of subproducts: the generated
hypotheses, the evaluation reports of them, and the selected hypoth-
esis. There has been a lot of dispute about whether Peirce meant to
Foundations of Science 4: 307–323, 1999.
© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
308 THEO A.F. KUIPERS
include the evaluation and selection phases in his notion of abduc-
tion, and his preference in this respect seems to have changed.
Neglecting this exegetical point further, we propose to speak only
of (the process of) abduction when the generation, evaluation, and
selection of hypotheses are all included, and to speak of abduction
in the strict sense when only the generation is meant.
Our investigations of types of scientific processes or products
are governed by the working hypothesis that the analysis of a
type of product may suggest an analysis of the process, and vice
versa. For example, in her discussion of abduction aiming at the
explanation of a surprising fact, Aliseda starts from the following
general characterization of the (total) product: a hypothesis H, such
that B, H ) E, where B represents the background knowledge,
H the generated hypothesis, E the surprising fact to be explained,
and ‘)’ a formal relation which has to be specified further, e.g.
as deductive consequence. In line with this product searched for,
Aliseda’s hypothesis generation algorithm systematically seeks, for
given B and E, hypotheses that close the deductive(ly specified) gap
between B and E. In the following we will use the same type of
product/process interaction.
From the general characterization in the beginning of this section,
it is clear that there are at least two more specific abduction tasks,
where we limit ourselves to the standard, ‘deductive’ versions.
Task I. In the case of a surprising observation, i.e. the situation
that E is not entailed by B, the task is to expand B with some H such
that B&H entails E, but H alone does not. This is called novelty
guided abduction.
Task II. In the case of an anomalous observation, i.e. the situation
that E contradicts B, the task is to revise B to B such that B entails
E. This is called anomaly guided abduction. There are at least two
different types of revision in this case. One is similar to the so-called
belief revision program: first contract B to some weaker B0, then
expand B0 with some H such that B0&H&E are consistent, neither
B0 nor H entails E, and B0&H (=B) entails E. The other type of
revision, presumably dominating in scientific practice, consists of
‘concretization’ of B to B, where B can be seen as an ‘idealization’
of B. This second type of revision falls as yet outside the reach of
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(most of) the algorithms considered. Hence, we focus on the first,
contraction-followed-by-expansion, type of revision.
To call not only the first but also the second, anomaly guided,
abduction task ‘standard’, is only defensible as far as approaches
are concerned that connect abduction with belief revision or with
applications in philosophy of science. Logical AI approaches and
abductive logic programming, for example, only deal with the first,
novelty guided, abduction task.
The main point of this paper is to generalize the standard abduc-
tion tasks to theory revision aiming at empirical progress (Task III)
and truth approximation (Task IV). Here, ‘theory revision’ may or
may not be conceived by definition as ‘theory revision within a
certain research program’. Below we will further explicate these
tasks in such a way that the following claims can be argued for.
The first claim is that Task I and II are special cases of Task III.
The second claim is that Task IV amounts to Task III and some
(additional) evaluation tasks. Hence, Task III or, more precisely, the
subtask called instrumentalist abduction can be viewed as the main
abduction task. The paper concludes with a survey of possible points
of departure, in AI and logic, for computational treatment of the
instrumentalist task guided by the ‘comparative evaluation matrix’.
2. ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL PROGRESS TASK
Task III, that is, theory revision aiming at empirical progress,
requires first of all an explication of the idea that a theory Y is
an empirical improvement over theory X. Our point of departure
for this explication is the evaluation report of a theory in terms
of its successes, failures and lacunae, according to the data at a
certain time. More specifically, successes of a theory are conceived
as explanatory successes, that is, observations that can be explained
by the theory, which include observations that have been success-
fully predicted. Here, ‘explanation’ is used in the liberal sense of
deductive or some other type of entailment of the relevant statement
by the theory, without assuming that the theory is true, or at least not
known to be false. On the contrary, from the present point of view,
the truth or falsity of a theory is not so important. What matters
is the success domination (see below) when compared with other
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theories. This is directly related to the truth approximation point of
view: a false theory may well be very close to the truth (in the sense
to be specified), and if it is closer to the truth than another one, it
will be at least as successful. The failures of a theory amount to so-
called anomalous observations or counterexamples, the descriptions
of which contradict the theory. Finally, lacunae pertain to surprising
observations, that is, observations that cannot be explained by the
theory, let alone predicted, but are at the same time not in conflict
with the theory.
Below we will define the idea that theory Y is more successful
than X at t in terms of their respective evaluation reports.
Presupposing such a definition, Task III can be divided into two
subtasks:
Task III search for a revision Y of X such that
1 Y is more successful than X, relative to the available
data, and
2 Y remains more successful than X, relative to all future
data
Whereas Task III.1 is really a subtask of Task III, Task III.2
essentially is a strengthening of the former.
Task III.1 may be called the instrumentalist task since ‘more
successful’ is, of course, defined in observation terms (relative to
the background knowledge) and Y may well be ‘born refuted’, that
is, Y may have failures. If so, they should be (at least as serious)
failures of X as well.
Clause 2 amounts to a further condition on Y relative to X.
Suppose we have constructed a theory Y that is, relative to the
available data, more successful than X. Then the question remains
whether it will remain at least as successful as X relative to all future
data. This amounts to what might be called the empirical progress
hypothesis or comparative success hypothesis (CSH). It is important
to realize that CSH is a decent empirical, that is, falsifiable, hypoth-
esis, which is serious even if Y is known to be false. CSH can be
tested by suitable experiments and will be accepted, for the time
being, when ‘sufficiently many and varied experiments’ have failed
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to falsify it. In that case, empirical progress has been made, or at
least it seems so.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE TRUTH APPROXIMATION TASK
Recall that Task IV dealt with theory revision aiming at truth
approximation:
Task IV search for a revision Y of X such that Y is closer to the
truth than X
The condition will be called the truth approximation hypothesis
(TAH). Note again that TAH is serious even if Y is (known to be)
false. To be sure, the condition presupposes a definition of ‘closer
to the truth’ and hence, first of all, a definition of ‘the truth’. The
latter is defined relative to the (union of) vocabularies of X and Y
and the relevant domain as the strongest, hence most informative,
true hypothesis that can be formulated within the vocabulary about
the domain. Hence, ‘the truth’ is conceived in a constructive,
non-essentialistic way. In the natural sciences the domain pertains
to all physical possibilities of a certain kind, in which case the truth
will not be complete (as long as we do not include modal operators
in the vocabulary). Assuming this modal type of ‘the truth’, it is
possible to define ‘closer to the truth’ (or ‘more truthlikeness’) in a
naive and refined way such that everybody will at least agree that the
defining condition is a sufficient one. Unfortunately, it would lead
too far afield to elaborate these definitions here in a formal sense,
not least because one can give three versions of increasing strength.
For this purpose, the reader is referred to (Kuipers, 1997, 1999) for
details. Here it will be sufficient to give verbal formulations of the
three (naive) versions, in the context of a further analysis of Task IV.
Task IV search for a revision Y of X such that Y is
1 closer to the observational truth than X and
2 closer to the referential truth than X and
3 closer to the theoretical truth than X
In Task IV.1 the truth is restricted to the observational vocabulary.
In the next section we will argue in some detail that the first clause
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amounts to the conjunction of clauses 1 and 2 of Task III. For this
reason it will be called the (constructive) empiricist task, where we
freely, but plausibly, presuppose a modal version of (constructive)
empiricism.
Clause 2 of Task IV adds the requirement that Y should be refer-
entially better than X in the sense that the referential claims of Y
regarding the joint theoretical vocabulary are at least as adequate
as those of X and superior in at least one respect. Here ‘referential
claims’ are interpreted as ‘contributing to the restriction of models
of the theory or not’, and they are true when this is so according to
‘the referential truth’, that is, the truth regarding the reference of the
theoretical terms, and false otherwise.
Finally, clause 3, to be called the constructive realist task, adds
that Y should be closer to the theoretical truth. Of course, the
theoretical truth is defined in such a way that it implies the obser-
vational as well as the referential truth in the sense that it reduces
to these truths when we restrict the attention to the observational
vocabulary and to referential claims of the theoretical vocabulary,
respectively.
The general idea of the (naive, qualitative) truth approximation
theory is that Y is at least as close to the truth as X when Y shares all
correct models of X and X shares all incorrect models of Y, where
a (in)correct model is of course a model that does (not) belong to
the (models of the) truth, that is, the strongest true theory. This idea
leaves room for theoretical and observational specifications in the
case of a stratified vocabulary.
4. RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPIRICAL PROGRESS AND (KINDS
OF) TRUTH APPROXIMATION
In (Kuipers, 1999) we have extensively argued that there are strong
relations between the various kinds of truth and successfulness and
hence between the corresponding abduction tasks. To begin with,
Task IV.3 is likely to be fulfilled when Task IV.2 is, but it is not
guaranteed. Moreover, Task IV.2 may well be fulfilled when Task
IV.1 is, but it is far from likely. At most one might say that it is
more likely than not. Hence, when Task IV.1 is fulfilled, additional
testing of the referential truth approximation hypothesis is required.
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When and only when evidence from different directions converges
(a happy situation called triangulation of evidence) do scientists tend
to accept referential claims.
We noted already that Task IV.1 essentially amounts to Task III.2.
In one direction it is almost obvious in the following sense: ‘closer
to the truth’, when construed in a safe way, not only implies ‘at
least as successful’ but even the possibility of some extra success.
But it is also plausible in the other direction. For ‘remaining more
successful’ could be violated when Y is ‘not closer to the observa-
tional truth’ than X, since the latter would leave room for an extra
success of X relative to Y.
So let us turn to Task III.2, assuming that Task III.1 has delivered
a suitable Y. The second clause requires further comparative testing
of Y against X. This asks for the generation and testing of distinctive
test implications. Relative to Task III.1, Task III.2 amounts to the
evaluation phase of a hypothesis generated by the former. Hence,
there remains as the abduction task in the strict sense, Task III.1, the
instrumentalist task.
In sum, abduction aiming at empirical progress amounts to
the generation Task III.1 and the further evaluation task required
by Task III.2. Moreover, abduction aiming at truth approximation
requires in addition only some further evaluation tasks, in particular
regarding reference claims. To be sure, selection is not yet included
in this picture, but it is fairly obvious how that could be done.
Suppose that the generation task has produced two alternative
revisions of X, viz. Y and Z, and suppose that both survive the
additional evaluation tasks. Then the selection question is of course
whether one is a suitable revision of the other. To begin with, e.g.
is Z more successful than Y, relative to the available data? If so, the
other evaluation questions have to be raised. If not, and if Y also
fails to be more successful than Z, that is, if Y and Z have ‘divided
success’, there arises a new generation task, viz. to construct a
hypothesis that is more successful than Y and Z, and hence, than X.
Of course, this selection story can be generalized to finitely many
theories generated as improvements of X. The conclusion remains
that the primary abduction task aiming at empirical progress or
even at truth approximation is the instrumentalist task III.1. The rest
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is evaluation and selection, and possibly new generation tasks for
further improvement.
5. THE REMAINING INSTRUMENTALIST TASK
Recall that Task III.1 amounts to:
search for a revision Y of X (possibly within one research
program) such that Y is more successful than X at time t
For the crucial definition of ‘more successful’ there are two related
alternatives, an asymmetric and a symmetric one. Both definitions
may be called ‘dominance’ definitions, providing at least sufficient
conditions, and hence leaving room for more liberal definitions.
Moreover, in both cases there are naive and refined versions, but
we restrict the attention to the naive versions. The asymmetric one
reads:
Y is (at t) more successful than X iff (at t)
− X shares Y’s individual counterexamples
− Y shares X’s general explanatory successes
− at least once, not vice versa
This definition seems in accordance with scientific practice and
is in close harmony with a similar, intuitively appealing, asym-
metric definition of ‘closer to the truth’. However, there are also two
symmetric definitions, an individual and a general one, that are at
least as much in accordance with scientific practice, but less straight-
forwardly related to the intuitively appealing definition of ‘closer
to the truth’. The symmetric definitions are in terms of individual
or general successes, lacunae and failures and are suggested by the




Failures 0 − −
Y Lacunae C 0 −
Successes C C 0
The (comparative) evaluation matrix
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Besides neutral results (0), there are three types of results which are
favorable (+) for Y relative to X, and three types of results which are
unfavorable (−) for Y relative to X. Now Y is more successful than
X when there are, besides neutral results, some favorable results for
Y and no unfavorable results for Y.
It is not difficult to check that both symmetric definitions and
the asymmetric one are essentially equivalent, that is, equivalent
assuming some boundary conditions. Moreover, in particular in the
symmetric set-up, it is clear that the different types of favorable
results could be given different weights, which may be useful for
non-dominance definitions. Another point of refinement is that fail-
ures, lacunae and successes may be given different weights even
if they belong to the same comparative category. E.g. as Hanne
Andersen (to appear) notes, anomalies may be graded as ‘mere’
anomalies, important anomalies or even severe ones.
Finally, it is clear from the symmetric definition that Task I and
II are special cases of Task III.1. In the case of Task I, dealing with
a surprising event, we have an individual or general fact which is
a lacuna for X, but a(n) (explanatory) success of Y. In the case of
Task II, dealing with an anomalous event, we have an individual or
general fact which is a failure for X, and a success of Y. Hence,
the two standard abduction tasks are included in the instrumentalist
abduction task. In other words, the latter is a generalization of the
standard tasks. However, in the two standard cases the revised theory
has to be compatible with all the available data, whereas this need
no longer be the case in the non-standard cases. This is one of the
fundamental differences, if not the most fundamental one, between
standard and non-standard cases.
The resulting invitation for abduction aiming at empirical
progress and even truth approximation reads: design instrumentalist
abduction along symmetric or asymmetric lines. At first sight, it
may seem to be a generalization of the standard tasks with fewer
constraints, since no consistency between the new theory and the
data is required; hence the threat of becoming intractable seems real.
However, since the required piecemeal improvements need to avoid
drawbacks, every success and every lacuna (not being the target)
provide an extra constraint.
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6. AI-PROSPECTS FOR COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES TO
INSTRUMENTALIST ABDUCTION
There are several computational ideas and computer programs
dealing with (standard) abduction and theory revision. Here we will
give an (incomplete) survey of them. It is only meant as a starter
for a research project that first tries to complete the present survey
as much as possible and next selects one or two possibilities for
computational elaboration in the direction of the above described
instrumentalist abduction task. At first sight, all indicated programs
seem worthy of further investigation for this purpose, in particular
when guided by the (symmetric) comparative evaluation matrix, for
in most programs the data to be explained and the anomalous data
are of the same, individual or general, nature.
We start by reviewing some of the leading AI-ideas/programs for
abduction and theory revision, viz. Thagard’s program PI and those
presented in (Shrager and Langley, 1990). In Section 7 we will deal
with some logic oriented approaches. In the final section we will say
a few words about evaluation and selection.
Paul Thagard’s program PI (Processes of Induction) (Thagard,
1988) is based on a distinction between six forms of induction,
four of which are called abduction: individual, rule, existential, and
analogical abduction. All of them are basically cases of standard
novelty guided abduction. PI is grafted upon models of heuristic
search developed in cognitive psychology. Hence, abductive explan-
atory problems are approached by PI, in a quasi-connectionist way,
by activation of the concepts occurring in the problem, followed by
the activation of concepts coupled to the first ones by rules (‘rule
firing’). PI does not deal with anomaly guided abduction, and, more
generally, in its present form PI has serious limitations in the sphere
of evaluation and selection, since it is restricted to still unfalsified
theories (see below). However, it seems certainly worthwhile to
try to revise PI in order to overcome these limitations (for some
suggestions, see Kuipers, 1993).
Let us now turn to AI-programs for abduction and theory revi-
sion presented in (Shrager and Langley, 1990). The ‘Abduction
Engine’ (AbE) of O’Rorke, Morris and Schulenburg pretends to
make revolutionary revision of a theory possible, starting from an
observational anomaly between the theory, the knowledge base,
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and new data. AbE uses Forbus’s Qualitative Process language
(Forbus, 1984) for describing qualitative changes due to processes
acting on quantities. After the recognition of an anomaly, the theory,
conceived as a hierarchically ordered set of principles, is weakened
(contraction) to a basic theory that is compatible with the new data.
Next, this basic theory is strengthened (expansion), roughly along
similar lines as in Thagard’s PI, to a theory that is able to explain the
anomalous data. The program is developed on the basis of the trans-
ition of the phlogiston theory to the oxygen theory of combustion.
Hence, it is no surprise that the program is able to reproduce that
episode. It is easy to recognize in this step-wise procedure an overall
case of anomaly guided abduction, and a subcase of novelty guided
abduction. Hence, it deals with standard cases of instrumentalist
abduction.
In the program COAST of Rajamoney, also using Forbus’s Quali-
tative Process language, theory revision is approached step-wise: 1)
registration of an anomaly between new data and a theory in the
knowledge base, 2) design of revision proposals that transform the
anomalous data into explanatory successes, where revision oper-
ators act on components, domains and effects, 3) suggestion of
(new) experiments, 4) first selection on the basis of the anomaly
to be explained, the outcome of the experiments, and the degree
in which previous successes are retained, 5) further selection on
the basis of simplicity and predictive power (strength). It is easy
to recognize in these steps standard abductive steps and consec-
utive evaluation and selection phases. COAST, and the following
two programs, were guided in their development by examples from
biochemistry.
The program KEKADA of Kulkarni and Simon is globally
similar to COAST, apart from differences indicated below. It
registers surprising phenomena by comparing new experimental
results, obtained for ‘normal’ purposes, with expectations on the
basis of the knowledge base, and proceeds by dealing with such
phenomena. That is, it tries to revise the relevant theory and
proposes experiments to test such revisions. For this purpose, five
strategies are built into the program, each of which consists of an
hypothesis generator, an experiment proposer and an evaluator. For
example, the core idea of the first strategy is to try to strengthen
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the surprising phenomenon by independently manipulating the vari-
ables of the system.
Karp’s program HYPGENE is conceptually rather different from
the previous ones. It considers hypothesis formation and revision
explicitly as a matter of design, with constraints (a profile of desired
properties) and operators that revise the provisional prototype (the
profile of factual properties) in order to let it satisfy the constraints
better and better. Here for the first time, non-standard cases are
naturally included for the revised prototype may well have failures.
As was pointed out in (Kuipers, Vos and Sie, 1992), the symmetric
definitions of ‘more successful’ (and of ‘closer to the truth’) are
completely analogous to the claim that one prototype is an improve-
ment of another, relative to a fixed intended profile. In other words,
the (ultimately) intended profile, in case of instrumentalist abduc-
tion, is a theory for which all data are successes. Van den Bosch
(1999) shows in this volume that a similar strategy can be based on
Anderson’s ACT-R.
Finally, Darden prepares in the volume of Shrager and Langley
the conceptual ground for a program still to be written by consid-
ering the solution of an anomaly of a theory as a task for diagnostic
reasoning, which has been developed for expert systems, guided
by the tracing of a defect in a technical system. She shows with
Mendelian examples (see also Darden, 1991) that the hierarchical
decomposition of all presuppositions of a theory may provide the
points of departure for solving the anomaly, and that its solution, as
in the famous analysis of some mathematical examples by Lakatos
(1976), may or may not lead to fundamental theory revision, that is,
a revision staying within a research program or breaking through the
barriers of the relevant program.
7. LOGICAL PROSPECTS FOR COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES
TO INSTRUMENTALIST ABDUCTION
One challenge for logic is the question to what extent the AI-
approaches sketched in the previous section can be reproduced in
a logically decent way. However, we will not pursue this further
here, and will concentrate on already existing purely or primarily
logical approaches. As far as we know, there are only a few logical
ABDUCTION AIMING AT EMPIRICAL PROGRESS 319
approaches to standard abduction and theory revision, viz. so-called
belief revision developed by Peter Gärdenfors and others (Gärden-
fors, 1988), non-monotonic logic approaches by Konolige (1990,
1996) and the semantic tableau approach introduced by Mayer and
Pirri (1993) (see also Pirri, 1995), which was recently redirected in
a more efficient way by Atocha Aliseda (1997). The precise relation
between belief revision and non-monotonic logic approaches on the
one hand and instrumentalist abduction aiming at empirical progress
and truth approximation on the other, has still to be investigated. For
example, prima facie, there are some important limitations of belief
revision, as seen from the instrumentalist abduction task. To begin
with, belief revision is rather ‘actual world’ oriented, instead of
oriented toward ‘physically possible worlds’ or, simply, ‘real world’
oriented. Moreover, it aims at a consistent product of the available
data and the resulting belief set. The latter feature it shares, however,
with almost all approaches, including the one by Aliseda.
Let us turn to a brief indication of Aliseda’s semantic tableau
method of novelty and anomaly guided abduction. As remarked
already earlier, her conceptual approach guided our presentation in
several respects. Here we only want to indicate briefly the basic
idea behind her algorithms, which are as yet restricted to proposi-
tional languages. Recall that a semantic tableau is a way to find out
whether a set of premises logically entails a conclusion by system-
atically trying to construct a counterexample, that is, a propositional
model or structure in which the premises are true and the conclusion
is false. If all branches generated by the (formula decomposing)
tableau rules from the set of premises and the negated conclu-
sion become ‘closed’, that is, contain a formula and its negation,
the argument is valid. Open branches describe counterexamples to
the argument. In the case of novelty guided abduction, there are
of course open branches in the tableau starting from the theory
and the negation of the phenomenon description. Systematically
closing these branches produces equally many consistent proposals
for abductive explanation of the novel phenomenon. In the case of
anomaly guided abduction, the theory apparently entails the nega-
tion of the anomaly, that is, the corresponding tableau starting from
the theory and the phenomenon description is closed. Now the task
is to systematically open the branches of this tableau by deleting
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parts of the theory (contraction), followed by adding new formulas
(expansion) that lead to the closing of all branches when combined
with the negation of the phenomenon description.
The above description neglects all nuances and versions of
Aliseda’s approach, but it may nevertheless already be plausible to
conjecture that the approach can be generalized to instrumentalist
abduction purposes. The main thing is to operationalize in tableau
terms the possibility that one theory is ‘more incompatible’ with
the data than another. Then the task is to generate theories that are
not more incompatible with the available data than the original one,
explain at least as much as the latter, and improve the latter in at
least one of these respects. Some other adaptations will be required
to make it suitable for scientific purposes. First, there should be left
room for general facts as data and, second, the original and resulting
theories should be of a general nature. When restricted to proposi-
tional languages, simple implicative formulas will do the job in both
cases, provided there is left room for three kinds of truth: actually
true, ‘physically true’ and logically true. One plausible way to do
this is using a modal propositional language (Zwart, 1988), but there
may well be other ways.
Let me conclude this section with some specific remarks. The
first deals with theory structure. In several approaches there is a
natural tendency to conceive theories in a hierarchical way (notably
O’Rorke c.c. and Darden). Starting from intuitive hierarchies as
used by scientists, this is easy to reproduce in syntactic as well as
semantic or structuralist axiomatizations of theories. However, when
such intuitive hierarchies are not available, the method of ‘natural
axiomatization’ developed by Gemes (1994) may well be helpful in
producing hierarchies.
The second remark pertains to the restriction to the ‘naive’
instrumentalist abduction task, viz. all examples of theory revision
presented so far deal with the three possible relations between a
theory and one individual or general fact: entailment, incompati-
bility, and no logical relation. The ‘refined’ instrumentalist abduc-
tion task asks for refinement of the second and third alternative:
one theory may approach or explain a (possibly incompatible) fact
better than another. It is likely that programs aiming at quanti-
tative theory generation and revision are more appropriate for these
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purposes. As a matter of fact, it is plausible to conjecture that
the BACON-programs, developed by Simon and others, can be
reconstructed as refined revision programs of quantitative (quasi-
true, that is, at most approximately true) laws. Although it will be
worthwhile to pursue this line further, and also to develop some-
thing like refined theory revision in the sense of ‘concretization’
of quantitative theories, the naive instrumentalist abduction task is
at least as important since it deals with qualitative theories. Before
refining propositional instrumentalist abduction, it will be necessary
to fully develop a naive version. Moreover, the generalization of the
suggested naive propositional instrumentalist abduction in tableau
terms, to first order logic may be considered as at least as important
as the indicated refinement.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Sections 5–7 may be seen as a description of a research project
aiming at the computational realization of instrumentalist abduction.
We close by indicating some general features of such programs.
First, although the terminology of theory revision suggests that there
should be a contingent initial theory, this is not so. It is possible
to start from the theory representing ignorance, that is, a tautol-
ogy, in which case the task is to improve upon ignorance. Second,
one may or may not aim at incremental abductive programs. A
program is incremental, starting from a certain theory and a certain
set of data, when the revised version dealing with these data, is
the point of departure when the set of data further increases. The
non-incremental alternative is that the second revision process starts
again from scratch, that is, from the original theory. Third, when
the generation process generates alternative theories, of which one
is more successful than all the other ones, the selection is clear.
Depending on the further aims of the program, the selection may
then be followed by further evaluation subprograms dealing with
empirical progress or truth approximation. When the generated
theories cannot be ordered in the suggested way due to ‘divided
success’ between any pair of theories, the generation task has not
yet been completed. Finally, when the result contains a couple of
theories that are at least as successful as all other theories, one
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may or may not want to have further selection. However, as long
as the data remain the same, one will have to use non-empirical
features, such as simplicity and strength. The strength criterion is
straightforwardly functional for empirical progress and hence for
truth approximation, in the sense that new data may well lead to the
conclusion that a stronger theory is more successful than a weaker
one. However, for the simplicity criterion such straightforward func-
tionality does not seem to exist as long as it does not imply the
strength criterion. On the contrary, as McAllister (1996) argues and
illustrates, simplicity or, more generally, beauty considerations may
well retard empirical progress.
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